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Abstract
TAC Market Design (or CAT) tournament is an effort to study
the competition among modern stock exchanges trying to at-
tract potential traders while maximizing their proﬁt. This
paper shortly presents Mertacor, our entrant for 2008, and
makes an attempt to evaluate its performance. We compare
Mertacor with the other available entries for the setting of
CAT 2008 as well as beyond the tournament. What’s more,
we introduce a simple yet effective way of computing the
global competitive equilibrium that Mertacor utilizes and dis-
cuss about its importance for the game.
Introduction
The invasion of the Internet in our daily life has given rise to
new, innovative applications of electronic commerce. Com-
mon examples include electronic marketplaces and online
trading systems that most of the major stock exchanges use
to trade futures, options, equities as well as their derivatives.
The double auction (DA) is an auction where multiple
buyers and sellers are able to make committed offers to
buy and sell goods and then accept similar offers. Be-
sides its prevalence in ﬁnancial and commodities markets,
many variants of the DA have been successfully applied
as a solution to a multitude of resource allocation prob-
lems (Dash et al. 2007; Gomoluch and Schroeder 2003;
Nisan et al. 1998), where different stakeholders compete
against each other to obtain units of a scarce resource. The
importance of DAs lies in the fact that they manage to ex-
hibit a high allocative efﬁciency (ratio of traders’ actual
proﬁt to their theoretical maximum proﬁt) with the imple-
mentation of very simple rules.
Mathematicians, economists and computer scientists have
long used game theory to analyze simple forms of this mech-
anism (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983; Kagel and Vogt
1993; Satterthwaite and Williams 1993) but their ﬁndings
have been criticized for being of scant relevance to prac-
tical scenarios due to their strict assumptions, like the in-
dependence of private values and traders’ full rationality.
Moreover, the dynamics of the CDA presents an important
obstacle in any pure theoretical approach. This led to the
adoption of simulation techniques where human subjects at
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ﬁrst (Smith 1962) and software agents afterwards (Gode and
Sunder 1993; Rust, Miller, and Palmer 1993) trade to verify
the effectiveness of the mechanism. The use of multi-agent
systems in this kind of experiments introduced a new scien-
tiﬁc ﬁeld, known as Agent-based Computational Economics
(Tesfatsion 2002).
Each DA consists of two distinct aspects: its structure and
its behavior (Vytelingum 2006). The latter is mainly occu-
pied with the bidding strategies of the traders and has dom-
inated related research. However, scientists have recently
turned their attention to the structure of the DA, that is, to
the rules and the protocols that govern every such auction.
The majority of the relevant literature until now deals with
isolated markets which operate free of charge. Nevertheless,
in today’s global economy, each country’s market institu-
tions compete with each other as well as with the remainder
stock exchanges worldwide. Having recognized this, sci-
entists from the universities of Liverpool and Southampton,
and Brooklyn College introduced TAC Market Design (or
CAT) tournament in 2007, in a joint effort to study the impact
of dynamically changing mechanisms on trading.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
short description of the CAT tournament. The notion of the
global competitive equilibrium and how Mertacor manages
to accurately estimate it are given in Section 3. Section 4
shortly discusses the strategies implemented by Mertacor for
the games of 2008. Section 5 presents the results of our ex-
periments, comparing Mertacor with its opponents. A brief
summary concludes the paper in Section 6.
CAT Tournament 2008
The CAT game consists of two principal entities: trading
agents(ortraders)andspecialists. Eachtradermaybeeither
a buyer or a seller willing to exchange goods, whereas each
specialist represents a DA market where these traders will
trade. Trading agents are provided by the organizers and
specialists are designed by the competition entrants. The
platform of the tournament is JCAT, a client-server imple-
mentation of the Java Auction Simulator API (JASA), pro-
viding additional support for the operation of multiple mar-
kets (Niu et al. 2008b).
Traders are equipped with a trading strategy and a market
selection strategy. The ﬁrst determines their bidding behav-
ior, the decision making process of selecting their offers (orshouts)inthemarket, andfollowsoneofthefourextensively
studied strategies in the DA literature, namely ZI-C (Gode
and Sunder 1993), ZIP (Cliff and Bruten 1997), RE (Roth
and Erev 1995) and GD (Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1998). The
market selection strategy speciﬁes the specialist to register
for their trades and is typically based on their proﬁt from
the market. Implemented market selection strategies in JCAT
treat the selection as an n-armed bandit problem (Sutton and
Barto 1998). Every trader is endowed with a set of goods
to trade and a private value (the maximum amount willing
to purchase or the minimum accepted sale’s price for buyers
and sellers respectively) for each of them. Both strategies
and private values constitute personal information which is
not revealed to the competitors during the game.
Each entrant owns a single exchange market and must ef-
fectively set its rules so as to meet his design objectives.
Common questions to answer are: Which offers to accept in
the market? How to match accepted offers? What should the
price of each transaction be? How much to charge for every
service provided?
Each game of CAT comprises several virtual trading days,
each of which is further divided in trading rounds of ﬁxed
duration. At the beginning of the day, specialists announce
their fees and traders must decide upon which market to se-
lect for the rest of this day. Traders’ shouts are single-unit
and persistent, meaning that every offer expresses the de-
sire to trade one unit of the commodity and, once accepted,
remains active until a transaction is executed or the end of
the day is reached. Traders’ private values are drawn from
an unknown distribution at the start of the game and remain
constant for the rest of it.
The daily evaluation of the entrants consists of three
parts: the market-share, which is the percentage of the total
traders’ population registered in the market, the proﬁt-share,
which is the ratio of the daily proﬁt a specialist obtains to the
proﬁt of all specialists, and, ﬁnally, the transaction success
rate (TSR), which is the percentage of the shouts accepted
that result in transactions. The daily score of each specialist
is the mean value of the above metrics. Assessment com-
mences and terminates in randomly selected days and total
score is the sum of the scores across these days (Gerding et
al. 2007).
The Global Competitive Equilibrium
The global competitive equilibrium is the competitive equi-
librium of the equivalent single global market where all the
buyers and sellers would trade had it not been their splitting
due to the existence of multiple specialists. In an efﬁcient
global allocation only globally intra-marginal traders (buy-
ers and sellers with private values above and below the price
of the global competitive equilibrium respectively) transact.
However, the diffusion of the traders in the various spe-
cialist markets provides the opportunity for the globally
extra-marginal traders to conduct transactions either for the
reason that they might be intra-marginal ones for the market
registered with or because of the inability of the speciﬁc spe-
cialist’s rules to prevent extra-marginal trades, thus leading
to a drop in both global and market’s (for the latter case) al-
locative efﬁciency. It is therefore to the entrant’s interest to
identifythisequilibriumandcoordinateitstransactionprices
with it.
To estimate this point Mertacor continually keeps track
of the highest bids (buy offers) and lowest asks (sell offers)
submitted in its market. These prices constitute the clos-
est available estimation of traders’ private values. More-
over, the number of goods traded every day in the past con-
sists a very accurate estimation of their daily endowment.
When a sufﬁcient number of trading agents have been ex-
plored, Mertacor forms the global cumulative demand and
supply curves and computes the desired competitive equi-
librium pair of price and quantity. This threshold was set at
80% of the total traders’ population for the games of 2008.
In addition, Mertacor exploits the possibility of subscription
provided by CAT, gaining access to the shouts placed in the
opponent markets, thus accelerating the process.
Table 1 illustrates the expected and estimated values of
the global competitive equilibrium price for the three ﬁnal
games of CAT 2008 (real prices are not available but organiz-
ers provided us with the distributions of private values after
the end of the tournament). As can be seen, the mean abso-
lute percentage error for our estimation is less than 2% in all
cases, validating the effectiveness of our method. It is inter-
esting to mention that our specialist managed to successfully
estimate this competitive equilibrium since the ﬁfth, eighth
and sixth trading day for the three ﬁnal games respectively.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the estimated probability den-
sity functions (pdf) of the prices of the lowest accepted asks
andthehighestacceptedbidsrespectivelythatwereobtained
by Mertacor’s log ﬁles for the ﬁrst ﬁnal game of TAC Market
Design 2008. The form of the pdf is similar for the remain-
ing games. The estimation of the pdf is based on the Parzen
window method, also called kernel density estimation (Bow-
man and Azzalini 1997). A closer look at these ﬁgures re-
veals a relative symmetry of the distributions around the ex-
pected global competitive equilibrium price (equal to 100).
This is further clariﬁed in Figure 1(c), illustrating the dis-
tribution of the prices of all the shouts recorded. As can be
observed, the resulting price distribution is very close to the
real uniform distribution of the private values, U(50;150).
We believe that the form of this distribution is caused by
the traders’ strategy mix selected, which was identical for
buyer and seller populations, and the fact that private values
were drawn from the same distribution for buyers and sell-
ers, leading to an almost equal mean proﬁt margin for both
trading sides.
Table 1: Expected and estimated global competitive equilib-
rium price for the ﬁnal games of CAT 2008.
Game Private Exp. Est. Abs.
Values Gl. CE Gl. CE Percentage
Distribution Price Price Error
1 U(50;150) 100 100:199 0:199%
2 U(100;200) 150 152:411 1:607%
3 U(70;170) 120 118:931 0:891%(a) Asks (b) Bids (c) Shouts
Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of the shout prices recorded by Mertacor for the ﬁrst ﬁnal game of CAT 2008.
Agent Mertacor
In this section we shortly describe the strategies followed by
our entrant, which was placed 5th in the ﬁnals of 2008. Mer-
tacor’s policies are primarily based on the theory of microe-
conomics, combined with heuristic techniques that improve
the agent’s performance for the speciﬁc setting of the tour-
nament. Our agent’s main design objective is the acquisition
of a satisfactory level of proﬁt-share score, compromising
its target for the market-share. Figure 2 illustrates Merta-
cor’s architecture. As shown, there are ﬁve different policies
along with the auctioneer and the market client parts.
The latter is the communication component of the agent,
converting incoming messages to a comprehensible form for
the specialist and, conversely, transforming Mertacor’s deci-
sions according to CATP, the message protocol of JCAT, and
then transmitting the resulting information to the CAT server.
The auctioneer acts as a coordinator among the rest of the
components, assembling and transferring all the information
required by each of them. In addition, it undertakes the re-
sponsibility to compute the global competitive equilibrium.
The successful estimation of this point initiates the steady-
state behavior of the agent discussed here. Before that, Mer-
tacor acts like a modiﬁed CDA market that has proved to be
effective in a variety of settings.
The quote-accepting policy determines the shouts that
will be accepted for potential transactions in the market.
Its ﬁltering behavior is crucial, as this component is mainly
responsible for the TSR score of the specialist. Mertacor
implements a global equilibrium beating accepting policy,
allowing only globally intra-marginal trades to take place
during the ﬁrst rounds of the trading day, and subsequently
switches to a policy that implements the NYSE rule, accord-
ing to which received shouts must beat the quote (current
best offer placed in the market).
After the acceptance of the qualiﬁed shouts, a specialist
must select the pairs of bids and asks that will lead to trans-
actions. Thisisthetaskofthematchingpolicy, whichimple-
ments the 4-heap algorithm (Wurman, Walsh, and Wellman
1998) in the case of Mertacor.
The price of each transaction is speciﬁed by the pricing
policy. Our contestant uses a uniform global equilibrium
pricing policy which sets the price of all the transactions at
Figure 2: Mertacor’s architecture.
the global competitive equilibrium price. This policy offers
each individual the same proﬁt that would be obtained in a
global efﬁcient allocation. For the last rounds of each day a
modiﬁed version of the side-based pricing policy, originally
introduced by IAMwildCAT (Vytelingum et al. 2008), is
utilized, providing a higher amount of proﬁt to the desired
globally intra-marginal traders.
The time of the transactions is determined by the clearing
policy. Mertacor uses a round clearing policy for the ﬁrst
rounds and then switches to a continuous clearing rule to
increase the volume of its transactions.
Finally, the charging policy selects the type and the
amount of the fees that registered traders should pay to ob-
tain market services. There are four different kinds of fees
in the CAT game: (a) the registration fee, charged for the
registration of the traders in the market, (b) the information
fee, for their access in an opponent market’s accepted shouts
and transactions executed, (c) the shout fee, for every shout
placed, (d) the transaction fee, for every transaction carried
out, and (e) the proﬁt fee, which is a percentage of the proﬁt
obtained by each trader from a transaction. Our specialist
charges a small proﬁt fee, since we decided that only prof-
itable traders ought to pay for their trades. Mertacor uses a(a) Market-share (b) Proﬁt-share (c) TSR
Figure 3: Tournament’s evaluation metrics for the one-to-one experiments. The polar coordinates of each vertex of the dashed-
line polygon represent opponent’s score whereas the coordinates of the vertices of the solid-line polygon represent Mertacor’s
respective score.
Table 2: Results of one-to-one experiments for the games
of CAT 2008. Each opponent is compared against Mertacor.
The second value in each column refers to the respective
mean score of Mertacor. Each experiment was repeated 9
times.
Opponent Score Efﬁciency Conv. Coef.
DOG 0.465 - 0.797 0.906 - 0.929 6.461 - 6.427
IAMwildCAT 0.382 - 0.848 0.885 - 0.936 9.156 - 5.029
jackaroo 0.655 - 0.584 0.937 - 0.877 6.047 - 7.475
MANX 0.594 - 0.684 0.913 - 0.935 7.414 - 6.943
MyFuzzy 0.473 - 0.701 0.890 - 0.943 7.741 - 5.904
PersianCAT 0.738 - 0.493 0.952 - 0.853 4.396 - 7.905
limited score-based charging policy, keeping the fee in the
interval [0:1, 0:3], and setting its amount based on its market
statistics and opponent scores. According to this policy, our
entrant makes an attempt to beat better opponents in time
intervals proportional to their score differences, also taking
into account its rivals with lower cumulative score but higher
daily score that might threaten its position in the game.
Mertacor’s Evaluation
We conducted a number of experiments to evaluate our spe-
cialist’s performance against its opponents. Our results are
not statistically signiﬁcant, considering the length of each
game (four hours approximately), which presents an impor-
tant limitation, as already mentioned in the analysis of (Niu
et al. 2008a). We adopt a similar methodology to (Niu et
al. 2007), originally introduced by (Tesauro and Das 2001)
for trading strategies, comparing our specialist in homoge-
neous and heterogeneous market settings. We have used our
post-tournament version of Mertacor, found as version 2 in
the TAC agent repository. All specialists were obtained from
the same repository, although we did not manage to include
BazarganZebel, CrocodileAgent and PSUCAT because of
their unstable operation.
Heterogeneous Markets
We ran a total of 18 experiments for the case of the het-
erogeneous markets. At ﬁrst, we carried out one-to-one
experiments where one market of each opponent competes
with one Mertacor specialist. The remainder of the exper-
iments concern one-to-many comparisons where ﬁve spe-
cialists of each entrant compete with one Mertacor and, con-
versely, ﬁve Mertacor markets operate against one opponent.
Traders’ strategy mix was identical to that of the games of
2008. More speciﬁcally, GD, ZIP, RE and ZI-C strategies
were followed by 20%, 30%, 30% and 20% of the trad-
ing agents for the ﬁrst game, 20%, 25%, 30% and 25% for
the second game, and 15%, 30%, 35% and 20% of the total
trader population for the third game respectively. All traders
followed an -greedy market selection strategy ( = 0.1, 
= 1). Each experiment was repeated 9 times (3 iterations
for each game). The duration of the games was 500 trading
days and each day comprised 10 rounds. The performance
criteria include the tournament’s evaluation metrics as well
as specialist’s allocative efﬁciency and coefﬁcient of conver-
gence. The latter is proportional to the standard deviation of
transaction prices around the market’s competitive equilib-
rium price and constitutes a measure of their volatility.
One-to-One Experiments. The score of each competitor
depends not only on its policies but also on the trader pop-
ulation and its opponents in a game. This kind of experi-
ments isolates the inﬂuence of the specialists’ mix on a mar-
ket’s performance, making a direct comparison between two
competitors. Table 2 illustrates the mean values of score,
allocative efﬁciency and coefﬁcient of convergence for our
comparisons with Mertacor.
These ﬁndings generally agree with the results of the tour-
nament, except for the case of MANX, which was placed
second in the ﬁnals, although this may be due to the minor
modiﬁcation of Mertacor’s charging policy for our experi-
mental setting. We found out that traders’ strategy mix does
not affect the quality of our results, as Mertacor is beaten
by PersianCAT and jackaroo and continually wins over the
other specialists. Figures 3(a)-3(c) show the market-share,
proﬁt-share and TSR in a polar system where the score of(a) Mertacor vs. DOG (b) Mertacor vs. IAMwildCAT (c) Mertacor vs. jackaroo
(d) Mertacor vs. MANX (e) Mertacor vs. MyFuzzy (f) Mertacor vs. PersianCAT
Figure 4: Daily score results of one-to-one experiments.
each opponent is represented by the coordinates of its vertex
in a dashed-line polygon and the respective score of Merta-
cor against each opponent is represented by the coordinates
of the vertices of a similar solid-line polygon. The proﬁt-
share score shows that Mertacor succeeds in its objective for
the proﬁt, although PersianCAT obtains a higher proﬁt-share
because of its greater market-share and similar charging pol-
icy. As can be seen, TSR constitutes the weakest metric for
Mertacor, being lower than the respective score for the ma-
jority of its rivals. Finally, there is an apparent impact of the
opponent’s selection on both allocative efﬁciency and coef-
ﬁcient of convergence, whose values are worse when Merta-
cor faces a stronger entrant and better for a weaker one.
It is also useful to see how specialists’ total scores change
on a daily basis, providing insights into the way that the du-
ration of the game affects our ﬁndings. In addition, these
graphs may help us segregate the start effect of the game,
revealing specialists’ steady state behavior. The results are
illustrated in Figures 4(a)-4(f). Score differences are con-
stant from the beginning of the game for the majority of the
results but there seems to be a small convergence for Merta-
cor and jackaroo and an obvious one for the case of MANX.
Figure 4(d) clearly illustrates the difference in the scores of
Mertacor and MANX for the ﬁrst days, mainly due to their
different charging policies implemented. Mertacor exploits
the fact that most of its opponents operate free of charge dur-
ing the initial days, setting its fees from the start of the game.
This has also helped PersianCAT to obtain a higher score
difference since the second game of 2008, when it switched
to an akin charging policy.
One-to-Many Experiments. In this experimental setting
one specialist of each contestant is compared with many
specialists of the same opponent. This kind of experiments
demonstrates how a specialist might exploit the competition
of the opponents in majority, revealing the beneﬁts of its de-
viation from a homogeneous market markup.
Table 3 shows the results of the one-opponent-to-many-
Mertacors experiments, evaluating opponents’ performance
against Mertacor. The mean values for the Mertacor refer to
the best performing market of our specialist in terms of its
total score. We have also included the mean ranking for the
single specialist, providing more details on their ability to
manipulate their Mertacor opponents. It becomes obvious
from these results that PersianCAT and jackaroo dominate
Mertacor in this kind of games, since they beat its markets in
all of the experiments conducted. Mertacor was the winner
for all of the remaining games except for the experiments
with MANX. The results for the latter are ambiguous, given
that it managed to win in one of the games and had a mean
ranking of three. Finally, we observe a better performance of
DOG than IAMwildCAT, even though the latter was placed
above the former in the ﬁnals of 2008, thus uncovering a
relative strength when it confronts our specialist.
The results of the experiments with one Mertacor versus
many opponent markets are illustrated on Table 4. The val-
ues for the opponents in majority also refer to their score-
maximizing specialist, whereas the mean ranking corre-
sponds to the Mertacor competitor. The results are similar
to the above except for the case of MANX and jackaroo.
Mertacor takes advantage of the competition among MANXTable 3: Results of one-to-many experiments for the games of CAT 2008. One opponent is compared with many Mertacor
specialists. The second value in each column refers to the best-performing Mertacor market. The mean ranking corresponds to
the single opponent specialist. Each experiment was repeated 9 times.
Opponent Op. Rank Score Market-share Proﬁt-share TSR Efﬁciency Conv. Coef.
DOG 6 0.351 - 0.424 0.153 - 0.182 0.011 - 0.203 0.888 - 0.886 0.889 - 0.928 6.665 - 6.724
IAMwildCAT 6 0.316 - 0.429 0.095 - 0.193 0.017 - 0.205 0.835 - 0.887 0.908 - 0.929 9.899 - 6.598
jackaroo 1 0.438 - 0.404 0.245 - 0.158 0.126 - 0.197 0.943 - 0.857 0.941 - 0.916 6.170 - 7.607
MANX 3 0.408 - 0.419 0.184 - 0.182 0.102 - 0.189 0.939 - 0.886 0.926 - 0.934 7.233 - 7.234
MyFuzzy 6 0.279 - 0.419 0.131 - 0.190 0.118 - 0.177 0.588 - 0.890 0.884 - 0.933 7.956 - 7.065
PersianCAT 1 0.482 - 0.388 0.274 - 0.152 0.232 - 0.175 0.938 - 0.837 0.952 - 0.903 4.630 - 7.410
Table 4: Results of one-to-many experiments for the games of CAT 2008. Many specialists of each opponent are compared with
one Mertacor. The second value in each column refers to the best-performing opponent market. The mean ranking corresponds
to the single Mertacor specialist. Each experiment was repeated 9 times.
Opponent Mert. Rank Score Market-share Proﬁt-share TSR Efﬁciency Conv. Coef.
DOG 1 0.364 - 0.686 0.161 - 0.230 0.018 - 0.926 0.913 - 0.903 0.911 - 0.937 6.848 - 6.730
IAMwildCAT 1 0.375 - 0.683 0.174 - 0.409 0.072 - 0.728 0.879 - 0.913 0.930 - 0.942 7.684 - 4.898
jackaroo 2.333 0.422 - 0.416 0.186 - 0.131 0.161 - 0.313 0.919 - 0.804 0.923 - 0.882 6.884 - 7.790
MANX 1.222 0.420 - 0.446 0.173 - 0.174 0.158 - 0.301 0.930 - 0.862 0.924 - 0.931 8.378 - 8.072
MyFuzzy 1 0.329 - 0.502 0.140 - 0.340 0.171 - 0.230 0.677 - 0.935 0.905 - 0.954 8.323 - 6.056
PersianCAT 5.889 0.430 - 0.339 0.187 - 0.124 0.194 - 0.137 0.910 - 0.755 0.926 - 0.852 5.919 - 8.035
specialists and wins in almost all of the games. This is true
for the jackaroo opponents as well, where Mertacor was the
winner of ﬁve games, obtaining a mean ranking of 2:333.
A closer look at the market-share and proﬁt-share metrics
of Tables 3 and 4 reveals an increased proﬁt-share score per
trader for Mertacor when it faces multiple homogeneous op-
ponents for all of the results except for the games against
PersianCAT. This mirrors the inﬂuence of our charging pol-
icy on Mertacor’s score and is the main reason for its relative
success over jackaroo for some of the last experiments, al-
though the values of allocative efﬁciency and coefﬁcient of
convergence are better for the latter in these games.
Homogeneous Markets
In this kind of experiments all specialists implement the
same policies, revealing their ability to cooperate and pro-
duce desirable global outcomes for the trading agents. This
is very useful in cases where the designer owns all of the
specialists. The metrics used for our evaluation in this set-
ting include the global allocative efﬁciency and the global
coefﬁcient of convergence. The latter is proportional to the
standard deviation of the prices from the global competitive
equilibriumpricedividedbythatprice. Theglobalallocative
efﬁciency is deﬁned as the ratio of the traders’ actual proﬁt
to their theoretical maximum proﬁt (obtained, according to
microeconomic theory, when the price of all the transactions
is set at the global competitive equilibrium price) had all the
traders been in a single global market.
We ran 7 different experiments, one for each contestant.
Each experiment was repeated 9 times and comprised 6 spe-
cialists and 240 ZI-C traders (120 buyers and 120 sellers).
Theselectionofthisstrategyliesinthefactthatthesetrading
agents exhibit zero rationality, submitting offers at random,
so we expect to obtain a lower bound for the allocative efﬁ-
ciency and an upper limit for the coefﬁcient of convergence.
Moreover, all trading agents follow an -greedy market se-
lection strategy ( = 0.1,  = 1). We have chosen not to use
a random market selection strategy, as this would annihilate
the inﬂuence of the specialists’ charging policy on traders’
movement among the markets and, consequently, on their
global performance obtained.
Table 5 illustrates the results for these experiments. As
shown, MANX,jackarooandPersianCATarethemostglob-
ally efﬁcient specialists, although the differences observed
among markets are diminutive. Most important, the global
allocative efﬁciency might be lower than its respective value
Table 5: Results for homogeneous markets populated by ZI-
C traders following an -greedy market selection strategy.
Each experiment was repeated 9 times.
Specialist Global Efﬁciency(%) Global Conv. Coef.
MANX 93.516 8.598
jackaroo 93.134 6.813
PersianCAT 93.081 4.213
Mertacor 92.542 8.094
IAMwildCAT 92.247 4.799
DOG 91.063 5.697
MyFuzzy 90.940 5.231for a single market, as expected, but its mean value is above
90% in all cases, validating once again the effectiveness of
the DA mechanism regardless of the traders’ strategy mix
utilized. PersianCAT presents a notably small value for the
global coefﬁcient of convergence, followed by the markets
of IAMwildCAT and MyFuzzy, thus revealing a quick con-
vergence of the transaction prices to the global competitive
equilibrium. On the other hand, jackaroo and, particularly,
MANX and Mertacor produced much higher values for this
metric, despite being more efﬁcient than the two last spe-
cialists above.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have shortly described CAT tournament as
well as our agent’s policies for the games of 2008.
Moreover, we have introduced a successful way of com-
puting the global competitive equilibrium, constituting the
most valuable component of our specialist’s strategy. The
importance of this point is twofold. From a market de-
signer’s perspective, the successful approximation of this
point may help him meet his design objectives. The main
challenge for a CAT specialist is to promote not only the
quantity but also the quality of its traders’ population, identi-
fying and attracting the globally intra-marginal clients, thus
increasing both its allocative efﬁciency and potential proﬁt
from trades. This computation along with the classiﬁcation
of the bidding strategies might be the key to the success.
From the trading agent’s view, this estimation might provide
the opportunity to obtain novel bidding strategies for multi-
ple markets. Moreover, the global competitive equilibrium
could be utilized from an arbitrageur (trader that exploits
the price difference of the same good exchanged in multiple
markets, buying it low and then selling it high) to identify
the most proﬁtable stock exchanges for its trades irrespec-
tive of the markets’ pricing policies implemented. However,
we must examine how modifying private values’ distribu-
tion, trading strategies and market rules might affect our es-
timation results.
In addition, we have provided a thorough analysis of the
competition of CAT entrants against Mertacor. We have
compared our agent in one-to-one and one-to-many, as well
as in homogeneous market settings. We have concluded that
the results of the tournament are in accordance to our ﬁnd-
ings, although there seems to be a slight divergence in the
case of MANX, which deserves further investigation. The
major problem with Mertacor is its low score of transac-
tion success rate, which is possibly due to its quote-beating
accepting policy for the last rounds of each day, allowing
the submission of extra-marginal shouts. On the other side,
Mertacor manages to obtain a respectable level of proﬁt in
the majority of the cases, being the second most proﬁtable
specialist in our experiments, thus accomplishing its main
design objective.
The absence of a dominant strategy for the TAC Mar-
ket Design setting provides each contestant with the incen-
tives to attempt to improve his specialist’s behavior. Hence,
we intend to conduct more experiments to detect the main
sources of Mertacor’s inefﬁciency and eliminate them for
our participation in the CAT tournament 2009.
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